University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law

DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law
Proxy

2012

Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano: Nasal Spray
Decision Throws Corporations Off the Scent of
"Materiality" Definition
Marcie Brecher

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/proxy
Part of the Securities Law Commons
Recommended Citation
7 Journal of Business & Technology Law Proxy 1 (2012).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Proxy by an
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

Marcie Brecher*

Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano: Nasal Spray
Decision Throws Corporations Off the Scent of
“Materiality” Definition

In Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano,1 the United States Supreme
Court considered whether a plaintiff bringing a securities fraud claim under the
Securities Exchange Act Section 10(b)2 and Securities Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) Rule 10b-53 must allege that a pharmaceutical company’s undisclosed
adverse event reports are statistically significant.4 Citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson,5 the
Court held that materiality turns on whether a reasonable investor would consider
the undisclosed information to have “significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of available
information,” stating that, while statistical significance is not required, “something
more” than allegations of adverse events alone is necessary.6 The Court’s
“something more” standard makes it difficult for business entities to ascertain
materiality, and consequently, to know when a duty to disclose is triggered and for
courts to treat similarly situated defendants comparably.7 The Court’s silence on
how to apply the standard across industries may initiate unnecessary disclosures of
non-material information, hindering an investor’s informed decision-making.8
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my parents for their unwavering support and my journal colleagues for their invaluable comments and
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1. 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
4. 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1313 (2011). An adverse event is defined by the Food and Drug Administration as
“[a]ny adverse event associated with the use of a drug in humans, whether or not considered drug related . . .”
21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (a) (2010). Statistical significance is generally stated as a five–percent standard deviation
from the norm, but the percentage may differ by specific circumstances. David H. Kaye, Trapped in the Matrixx:
The U.S. Supreme Court and the Need for Statistical Significance, 11 Expert Evidence Rep. (BNA) No. 494, at 2
(Oct. 24, 2011) (noting that a p-value of 0.05 “ensures that inferring that something other than randomness is
at work when, in fact, randomness is all there is to it occurs no more often than 1 time in 20 (in the long run)”).
5. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
6. Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1318–23. See also infra Part III.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See infra Part IV.
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Matrixx v. Siracusano

I. The Case
A. Factual Background
Zicam, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., manufactures
over-the-counter, homeopathic common cold remedies, including Zicam nasal
spray and gel swabs.9 From 1999 to 2003, Matrixx sold millions of Zicam products
and received between twelve and twenty-three adverse event reports of anosmia—a
permanent or temporary loss of sense of smell—following the use of Zicam nasal
gel or spray.10 Early adverse event reports of anosmia came from three sources: Dr.
Alan Hirsch, Neurological Director of the Smell & Taste Treatment and Research
Foundation, Ltd.; Miriam Linschoten, Ph.D., of the University of Colorado Health
Sciences Center; and Dr. Bruce Jafek of the University of Colorado School of
Medicine.11 On October 14, 2003, Zicam users filed the first of four lawsuits during
the class period, alleging anosmia following Zicam use.12
Matrixx projected positive earnings expectations in 2003 and early 2004 on the
strength of the Zicam family of products, failing to disclose several pending lawsuits
in conversations with investors and the public.13 Matrixx’s 2003 SEC 10-Q filing in
November mentioned the possibility of significant costs associated with future
products liability lawsuits, but did not mention the lawsuit brought in mid-October
2003.14 In response to two negative news articles in early 2004, Matrixx denied any
connection between Zicam products and anosmia.15 Matrixx instead asserted that

9. Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., No. CV 04 0886 PHX MHM, CV 04 1012 PHX MHM, 2005 WL
3970117 at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 15, 2005), rev’d, 585 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011).
10. Id. at *1–3. The exact number of adverse event reports was disputed. Id. at 3. In 2002, a Matrixx VP
stated that the company had not conducted any studies, but had “hired a consultant to review the product.”
Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 585 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2009).
11. Both Hirsch and Linschoten reported one patient who experienced anosmia after Zicam use and
pointed Matrixx to earlier studies linking zinc to anosmia when applied intranasally. Siracusano, 585 F.3d at
1170. Jafek presented findings to the American Rhinologic Society that ten users of nasal gel, experienced “an
immediate, severe burning” and suffered a loss of smell. Id. at 1171. Matrixx denied Jafek’s request for
permission to name Zicam in the presentation. Id. During the class period, companies were not required to
report serious side effects from over-the-counter homeopathic drug use to the Food and Drug Administration.
Brief for Petitioner at 18 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011) (No. 09–1156), 2010 WL
3334501 at *18.
12. Siracusano, 585 F.3d at 1175.
13. Id. at 1171–73. On October 22, 2003, Matrixx announced third quarter net sales of 163% over third
quarter 2002 and later upwardly revised FY03 revenue expectations by 80% compared to FY02 on Zicam sales.
Id. at 1171. The following day, when Matrixx officers were asked to comment on any pending litigation
involving Matrixx or its officers, they denied the litigation and any knowledge about an SEC investigation. Id. at
1172. Matrixx was served with the first lawsuit on October 23, 2003, the day of the earnings conference call, and
there is no evidence that the comment was corrected by officers of the corporation thereafter. Id. at 1172. Three
additional lawsuits were filed against Matrixx on December 8, 2003, December 18, 2003, and January 23, 2004.
Id at 1175. The plaintiffs claimed these misstatements violated Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
because these lawsuits raised questions regarding the product safety of a core line of products. Id.
14. Id. at 1172.
15. Id. at 1172–75. In late January and early February 2004, the Dow Jones Newswires and Good Morning
America issued back-to-back reports, disclosing that Zicam was under scrutiny by the FDA and that Matrixx
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“two double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomized clinical trials” affirmed that the
active ingredient, zinc gluconate, was safe and effective in treating common cold
symptoms.16 On February 19, 2004, however, Matrixx stated that the data linking
the intranasal application of zinc gluconate to anosmia were inconclusive and that
further study would be undertaken regarding potential causation.17 Investors who
had purchased thousands of Matrixx shares between October 22, 2003 and February
6, 2004 filed a securities fraud class action claim against Matrixx and three Matrixx
executives, alleging that the corporation made materially false and misleading
statements about Zicam Cold Remedy products.18
B. Procedural History
The U.S. District Court of Arizona held the plaintiff had not made a prima facie
showing of either materiality or scienter, the first two elements in a securities fraud
claim, and granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.19 The court concluded that
statements by Matrixx would not become materially misleading unless the
corporation was aware of a “statistically significant” number of adverse events
threatening Zicam’s commercial viability. 20 The district court also determined that
the plaintiff failed to show scienter that Matrixx disbelieved their public statements
regarding Zicam product safety.21
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, considering whether the
district court erred in granting Matrixx’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.22 The Ninth

had been sued in at least three cases on anosmia claims. Id. Following the Dow Jones article on January 30, 2004,
MTXX fell from $13.55 to $11.97 per share and after the GMA report on February 6, 2004, the price fell from
$13.05 to $9.94 per share, its largest ever one-day drop in heavy trading. Id. After Matrixx’s denial of the Dow
Jones report, MTXX rebounded to $13.40 per share on February 3, 2004. Id. at 1174.
16. Id. at 1173. Matrixx asserted in press releases that “[i]n no clinical trial of intranasal zinc gluconate gel
products has there been a single report of lost or diminished olfactory function” and calling the allegations
“completely unfounded and misleading.” Id. at 1173. Matrixx also stated that the zinc sulfate used in the 1930s
polio studies linking zinc to anosmia is an entirely different compound from the zinc gluconate used in Zicam
products. Id. at 1174.
17. Id. at 1174. Matrixx reported in the 8-K filing that a panel of physicians and scientists had convened to
review the scientific data and concluded that there was “insufficient scientific evidence at this time to determine
if zinc gluconate, when used as recommended, affects a person’s ability to smell.” Id.
18. The plaintiffs claimed that the corporation’s omission of a material fact (the possible link between
Zicam intranasal application and anosmia), material misstatements regarding product safety, and failure to alert
shareholders of four pending products liability lawsuits gave rise to a duty to disclose and correct prior
statements. Siracusano, 2005 WL 3970117 at *1. A total of nine plaintiffs were involved in the four lawsuits at
the end of the class period. Siracusano, 585 F.3d at 1170–71. See also infra Part III (discussing Rule 10b-5).
19. Siracusano, 2005 WL 3970117 at *5–9.
20. Id. at *6–7. The district court analogized the facts to In re Carter-Wallace Sec. Litig. v. Hoyt. Id. at 6. As
there was no consensus between adverse medical reports and clinical data, the district court held that Matrixx
did not make a material statement or omission of fact. Id. at *7. The court stated that once a consensus emerges
between clinical data and adverse event reports, then the information is “sufficiently serious and frequent to
affect future earnings.” Id. The district court held that clinical trials by Matrixx did not disclose any risk of
anosmia and were at odds with the adverse event reports; therefore, there was no medical consensus. Id. at *7.
21. Id. at *8.
22. Siracusano, 585 F.3d at 1170.
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Circuit rejected the “statistical significance” test adopted by the lower court,
reasoning that the bright-line rule was inappropriate to “delicate assessments of the
inferences a ‘reasonable shareholder’ would draw from a given set of facts and the
significance of those inferences to him.”23 Instead, the Ninth Circuit engaged in a
fact-specific inquiry to decide whether a reasonable investor would have deemed
the data material to her informed decision-making.24
The Ninth Circuit determined that the allegations were pled with specificity and
taken together would have been material to a reasonable investor under all of the
circumstances.25 The court considered the reports to Matrixx by medical researchers
and specialists regarding their professional concerns about the levels of zinc in the
intranasal applications of Zicam, the four lawsuits in four states involving nine
plaintiffs during the class period, and more than 165 cases identified by April 2004
to have a “substantial likelihood” of altering the reasonable investors determination
of the “total mix” of information about Matrixx.26 The Ninth Circuit held that
twelve adverse event reports of anosmia, together with four impending product
liability suits, were material and gave rise to a duty to disclose.27 With respect to
scienter, the Ninth Circuit found that the inference of scienter was “cogent and at
least as compelling” as the alternative.28 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court’s ruling that the plaintiff had not sufficiently pled materiality and scienter and
remanded the case.29
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split and
determine whether “statistical significance” is required to plead materiality in a
securities fraud claim.30

23. Id. at 1178–79 (noting that “statistical significance” cannot be determined as a matter of law precisely
because “statistical significance is a question of fact”) (citing In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 621
(S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
24. Id. at 1179.
25. Id. at 1183.
26. Id. at 1179. The Ninth Circuit deemed the following reports supported a prima facie showing of
materiality: (1) Dr. Hirsch’s and Dr. Linschoten’s reports to Matrixx of one patient each with anosmia; (2) A
conversation between Linschoten and a Matrixx VP regarding studies that linked anosmia and zinc sulfate; (3)
Linschoten’s e-mail to Matrixx with abstracts linking zinc sulfate and loss of smell on September 20, 2002; (4)
University of Colorado researcher Jafek’s presentation of ten or eleven cases of patients with loss of smell after
using Zicam; (5) four lawsuits filed in four states involving nine users of Zicam who experienced anosmia; (6)
the 165 cases reported by April 2004 (these cases were stricken from the record by the district court as they were
reported after the close of the class period). Id.
27. Id. at 1179–80.
28. Id. at 1183. Between 1999 and 2003, Matrixx knew of a suspected link between zinc gluconate and
anosmia based on adverse event reports from medical experts and researchers. Id. at 1182. Despite these reports,
the Ninth Circuit found that Matrixx asserted the safety of Zicam in several press releases without conclusive
studies on the matter and did not disclose pending lawsuits in a November 2003 filing to the SEC. Id. at 1182–
83. Although scienter is often proven by a personal financial motivation absent in this case, the absence of such
proof is not fatal. Id. at 1182.
29. Id. at 1183.
30. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1313 (2011).
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II. Legal Background
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 are designed to
regulate and prevent unfair and manipulative practices in the securities markets.31
Section 10(b) makes it illegal for “any person, directly or indirectly . . . [t]o use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any securitiesbased swap agreement . . . any manipulative or deceptive device . . . .”32 Rule 10b-5
proscribes manipulative and deceptive practices, stating that it is “unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly . . . to make any untrue statement of a material fact or
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading . . . .”33
To survive a motion to dismiss in a securities fraud claim brought under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of six
elements: “(1) the misrepresentation or omission of a material fact; (2) made with
scienter; (3) in connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) on which the
plaintiff relied; and (5) that was causally connected to (6) the plaintiff’s loss.”34 The
threshold element in any securities fraud case is materiality, and since Basic Inc. v.
Levinson,35 courts have sought to strike a balance that will lead to disclosure of
material information without flooding the market with inconsequential data.36 The
Basic Court outlined two tests for materiality—one for events certain to occur and
the other for contingent events—leading to a circuit split.37

31. See Message from the President of the United States, March 29, 1933, reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 73-12
(1933), reprinted in 2 J. S. Ellenberger and Ellen P. Mahar, Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933 and
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Item 15 (1973) (calling for “full publicity and information, and . . . [proposing
that] no essentially important element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying public” in order
to promote public confidence in the securities market); S. Rep. No. 73-47, at 1 reprinted in 2 J. S. Ellenberger
and Ellen P. Mahar, Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Item
17 (1973) (stating the purpose of Securities Act is to “inform[] the investor of the facts concerning securities to
be offered for sale in interstate and foreign commerce and provid[e] protection against fraud and
misrepresentation”); and Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (noting the purpose of the Securities
Exchange Act was “to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices”).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
33. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2010).
34. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005).
35. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
36. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
37. The two tests courts should use to determine materiality of a misstatement of fact or omission are the
TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway, Inc. standard (“total mix”), when the impact of an event is certain; and the SEC v.
Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co. test (“probability/magnitude”), when an event is contingent or speculative. Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988). The First, Second and Third Circuits applied the “probability/magnitude”
test, measuring the magnitude of an event by “statistical significance,” while the Ninth Circuit used the “total
mix” standard. Compare In re Carter–Wallace, 150 F.3d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying a test of statistical
significance for materiality), Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 283–84 (3d Cir. 2000) (Alito, J.) (finding that
absent a showing of “statistical significance” that proved causation, non disclosure was not material), and N.J.
Carpenters Pension & Annuity Funds v. Biogen IDEC Inc., 537 F.3d 35, 50 (1st Cir. 2008) (stating that as a
matter of law, adverse event reports must be statistically significant) with Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc.,
585 F.3d 1167, 1179 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that materiality turns on the “total mix” standard articulated in
Basic v. Levinson).
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The Court held in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder38 that scienter, the second element,
is required in a securities fraud claim.39 After the passage of Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995,40 the Court held in Tellabs v. Makor41 that a “‘strong
inference’ of scienter” requires the “intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud” to be
at least as cogent as any other presumption.42
A. Basic Develops the Fundamentals of Materiality.
Interpreting Rule 10b-5,43 the United States Supreme Court articulated a legal
standard for materiality that aimed to balance the goal of corporate transparency
with the risk of a marketplace flooded with useless information.44 In Basic Inc. v.
Levinson,45 a securities fraud claim concerning non-disclosure of pre-merger
discussions, the Court articulated two tests for materiality, expressly adopting the
holding in SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur46 in the 10(b) context for contingent events and
discussing the TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc.47 rule when events are certain.48 The
Basic Court stated that when the impact of an event is certain, courts should
38. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
39. Id. at 197–99 (construing the language of § 10-b “to use or employ . . . any manipulative or deceptive
devise or contrivance” as reflecting Congressional intent for a statement or omission to have been made with
scienter, an intent to manipulate and noting that manipulation is a term of art in the securities markets wherein
the price of securities are artificially affected and controlled in order to cheat or mislead investors).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(1), (2) (2006). PSLRA was enacted with the dual goals of creating a uniform
pleading standard that would curb some abuses of § 10(b) private actions and preserving an investor’s ability to
recover. Tellabs v. Makor, 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
41. 551 U.S. 308 (2007). In Tellabs, the Court held that the inference of scienter is a comparative analysis
between the culpable and “plausible, nonculpable explanations.” Id. at 323–24.
42. Id. at 324. The SEC addressed scienter in SAB 99, stating that in certain circumstances an intentional
immaterial misstatement or omission of fact may be unlawful. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed.
Reg. 45150 (Aug. 12, 1999) (“SAB 99”). During oral arguments in this case, Justice Kennedy questioned
whether the independent analysis is correct and whether the two elements should be analyzed concurrently.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 130 S. Ct. 3411 (2011) (No. 09–
1156).
43. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b–5 (2010).
44. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448–49 (1976) (articulating the vital balance
between transparency in the marketplace and the potential adverse consequences of disclosure that would “bury
the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information[,] a result that is hardly conducive to informed
decisionmaking”).
45. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 226 (1988) (noting that shareholders who sold stock prior to a
formal merger announcement alleged material misrepresentation of facts in violation of §10(b) and Rule 10b-5
because Basic publicly denied merger discussions).
46. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). In Tex. Gulf Sulphur, corporate insiders traded
on the undisclosed information, and the company put out an ambiguous statement about the drilling results
prior to full disclosure contrary to the report and indicia that this was one of the biggest finds in recent
memory. Id. at 849–51. The Tex. Gulf Sulphur court decided that nonpublic information about vast ore deposits
located close to the surface was material by examining the importance attached to the information by the
corporation and corporate insiders as well as the market response to the magnitude of the discovery after
disclosure. Id.
47. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
48. TSC Indus., Inc. 426 U.S. at 449–50 (holding that materiality is a mixed question of law and fact, and
only where the omissions were “so obviously important to an investor, that reasonable minds cannot differ on
the question of materiality” is the question properly settled as a matter of law by summary judgment).
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measure materiality by the “substantial likelihood” that the event will significantly
alter the “total mix” a reasonable investor deems important to investment
decisions.49 Alternatively, in cases of contingent or speculative events, courts should
determine materiality by balancing the “probability the event will occur relative to
the anticipated magnitude of the event” compared with total company activity.50
Basic was remanded and the lower court was advised to apply the “probability/
magnitude” test to non-disclosure of pre-merger discussions and weigh
probabilistic factors such as “board resolutions, instructions to investment bankers,
and actual negotiations” against “the magnitude of the transaction to the issuer of
the securities[,] . . . the size of the two corporate entities[,] and the potential
premiums over market value.”51 The Basic Court rejected the “agreement-inprinciple” rule for materiality in the merger context, noting that materiality is an
inherently fact-specific inquiry and any bright-line rule in which any one fact is
considered dispositive is necessarily “overinclusive or underinclusive.”52
B. Applying Basic Is Fundamentally Complex.
After Basic, the First, Second and Third Circuits looked to a quantitative
measurement of “probability/magnitude” in the pharmaceutical context and
adopted a five-percent quantitative “statistical significance” valuation while the
Ninth Circuit applied the “total mix” rule.53 For example, in In re Carter-Wallace,54
the Second Circuit held that a pharmaceutical company had no duty to disclose
information regarding adverse events suffered by users until there was “statistically
significant evidence” of a causal link from the drug to the side effect.55 The In re
Carter-Wallace case involved deaths related to the use of the drug Felbatol, the first
of which was reported in January 1994.56 Carter-Wallace did not disclose this
information until August 1994 when there was evidence of ten deaths, causing a
49. Basic, 485 U.S. at 231–32.
50. Id. (applying the probability/magnitude rule in the pre-merger context) (internal citations omitted).
51. Id. at 239, 250 (indicating this was a non-exhaustive list of considerations).
52. Id. at 236 (determining that as materiality is “an inherently fact-specific finding” that precludes “any
approach that designates a single fact or occurrence as always determinative”).
53. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Notably, the SEC released SAB 99 out of concern for
exclusive reliance on “statistical significance” in financial statement reporting. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin
No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45150 (Aug. 12, 1999). SAB 99 states that “statistical significance” is not dispositive to
determine materiality and notes other qualitative considerations such as: (1) “masks a change in earnings or
other trends”; (2) “hides a failure to meet analysts’ consensus expectations for the enterprise”; (3) concerns a
business segment that plays “a significant role in the registrant’s operations or profitability”; and (4) concerns
certain types of disclosures that have historically “demonstrated volatility of the price of a registrant’s securities”
thereby showing whether shareholders regard “quantitatively small misstatements as material.” Id.
54. 150 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
55. Id. at 157 (holding that a pharmaceutical company’s duty to disclose adverse event reports arise not
from “isolated reports of illnesses,” but only when “those reports provide statistically significant evidence that
the ill effects may be caused by—rather than randomly associated with—use of the drugs and are sufficiently
serious and frequent to affect future earnings”).
56. Id at 155.
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decline in stock price.57 Stockholders alleged that Carter-Wallace’s failure to disclose
the deaths constituted material misstatements in the 1994 10-K “Report to
Shareholders.”58 The In re Carter-Wallace court affirmed that failing to disclose
reports of Felbatol-related aplastic anemia deaths was not material, because CarterWallace “justifiably worked with” the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to
ascertain the probability of a link and had no duty to disclose until they had reason
to believe Felbatol’s “commercial viability was threatened.”59
The First and Third Circuits also adopted the “statistical significance” rule in
cases where pharmaceutical companies disclosed serious potential side effects to
FDA-approved drugs some time after the first report of a serious side effect.60 Citing
In re Carter-Wallace, the Third Circuit ruled in Oran v. Stafford61 that a failure to
disclose a potential link between use of a weight loss drug known as fen-phen and a
rare heart valve disorder was not material until the adverse event reports provided
“statistically significant” evidence of causation that would impact future earnings.62
As in In re Carter-Wallace, the drug company in Oran received reports of a serious
side effect and disclosed the information only after tracking twenty-four cases of a
rare heart valve disorder with the Mayo Clinic.63 In N.J. Carpenters Pension &
Annuity Funds v. Biogen IDEC Inc.,64 Biogen pulled its drug TYSABRI from the
market ten days after learning about a potential infectious link and one death.65 The
First Circuit assumed arguendo that the materiality element was met, but noted
that, as a matter of law, adverse event reports must be “statistically significant” in
order to satisfy the materiality element of a securities fraud claim.66 Thus, the First,
Second and Third Circuits applied a quantitative measure of “statistical
significance” to determine materiality.
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred when it applied
the “statistical significance” test to materiality in Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives,
Inc.,67 and instead applied the “total mix” standard.68 Rejecting a “statistical
57. Id. Carter–Wallace issued a “Dear Doctor” letter in coordination with the FDA and recommended that
doctors stop prescribing the drug in most patients because of evidence of a fatal form of bone marrow failure.
Id.
58. Id. at 157.
59. Id.
60. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
61. Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275 (2000).
62. Id. at 283. In Oran, American Home Products was alerted to a potential link in Europe as early as
1994, but disclosed the information only after monitoring and confirming twenty-four cases at the Mayo Clinic
from March to July 1997. Id. Unlike In re Carter–Wallace, the disclosure elicited no market change at the time of
disclosure. Id.
63. Oran, 226 F.3d at 282–83 (applying the efficient market hypothesis rule in addition to the “statistical
significance” test, then-Judge Alito held that because the stock price remained constant after disclosure, the
information was not material as a matter of law) (citing Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1425).
64. 537 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2008).
65. Id. at 37. FDA approval of Biogen’s drug TYSABRI was fast-tracked for use by multiple sclerosis and
Crohn’s disease patients; five out of 3,900 patients in a clinical trial suffered an infection, one died. Id at 37, 40.
66. Id. at 49–50 (affirming that the plaintiff had not sufficiently pled scienter).
67. Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 585 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011).
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significance” test, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the United States Supreme Court
had abandoned a bright-line rule in favor of a fact-specific inquiry of information a
reasonable investor would find significant to her investment decisions.69

III. The Supreme Court’s Reasoning
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision in a
unanimous opinion, holding that the Respondents stated a claim under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.70 The Court reaffirmed Basic,71 stating the question of
materiality turns on “whether a reasonable investor would have viewed the
nondisclosed information as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of
information made available.”72 The Court rejected any single factor as determinative
of materiality as “necessarily . . . overinclusive or underinclusive.”73 In so ruling, the
Court looked to Basic when stating that a test of statistical significance for
materiality would “artificially exclude[e]” relevant information that a reasonable
investor would incorporate into trading decisions.74 In addition, the Court stated
that while adverse events alone are insufficient to plead materiality, “statistical
significance” of adverse event reports is neither irrelevant nor dispositive.75
“Something more” than adverse events is required, such as “the source, content,
and context of the reports.”76 Finally, the Court re-affirmed that there is no
affirmative duty to disclose material information under Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, rather the duty arises to clarify or correct potentially misleading statements.77

68. Id. at 1178.
69. Id. at 1178–81 (applying the Basic Court’s “total mix” standard of materiality).
70. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1314 (2011). The case was noted as an unusual
victory for plaintiffs in securities fraud cases. Robert Barnes, Pair of Supreme Court Rulings Make It Easier to Sue
Companies, WASH. POST, March 23, 2011, at A15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com
/politics/supreme-court-sides-with-investors-workers-in-two-business-related-cases/2011/03/22/
ABbxzBDB_story.html; and Nathan Koppel, Securities-Fraud Plaintiffs Get Rare Win at Supreme Court, WALL
ST. J. LAW BLOG (March 22, 2011, 1:38 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/03/22/securities-fraud-plaintiffsget-rare-win-at-supreme-court/?KEYWORDS=%22Securities-Fraud+Plaintiffs+Get+Rare+
Win+at+Supreme+Court%22.
71. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
72. Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1321–22 (citing to Basic, 485 U.S. at 232) (internal quotation omitted).
73. Id. at 1318.
74. Id. at 1319–20. Critics note that the decision leaves companies without a critical benchmark to
determine whether or not to disclose adverse events. Carl Bialik, Making a Stat Less Significant, WALL ST. J.,
April 2, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703712504576235683249040812.
html?KEYWORDS=%22making+a+stat+less+significant%22.
75. Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1321.
76. Id. The Court also noted a multi-factor test that medical researchers and the FDA rely on when
assessing causation of adverse events as “strength of the association,” “temporal relationship of product use and
the event,” “consistency of findings across available data sources,” “evidence of a dose-response for the effect,”
“biological plausibility,” “seriousness of the event relative to the disease being treated,” “potential to mitigate
the risk in the population,” “feasibility of further study using observational or controlled clinical study designs,”
and “degree of benefit the product provides, including availability of other therapies.” Id. at 1320 (internal
citations omitted). The Court noted that the FDA requires warning labels once there is a suspicion of causation,
not proof of actual causation to the adverse event. Id. (internal citations omitted).
77. Id. at 1321–22.
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Applying the Basic “total mix” standard here, the Court determined that the
Respondents met the threshold for materiality.78 Looking to the “source, content,
and context” of the anosmia reports, the Court pointed out that the three medical
professionals and researchers raised plausible questions of biological causation
between intranasal application of zinc gluconate and anosmia, sharing with Matrixx
evidence from prior studies demonstrating the biological link.79 Furthermore, the
Court noted that consumers, weighing the risk of anosmia against the benefit of
using Zicam, would have used substitutes.80 Given the importance of the Zicam
family of products to the corporation, the undisclosed information constituted
material facts.81
With respect to the element of scienter, the Court stated that a plaintiff must
plead “with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind” and sufficiently to allege that “a reasonable
person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as
any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.”82 The Court found
that an inference of deliberate recklessness by Matrixx to protect their market share
was at least as compelling as the argument that Matrixx believed the product was
safe, but noted proving such facts at trial and “establish[ing] scienter is an
altogether different question.”83
The Court held that the Respondents adequately stated a claim under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.84

IV. Analysis
The United States Supreme Court correctly decided in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v.
Siracusano that the Respondents sufficiently pled materiality and scienter because
Matrixx failed to correct public statements denying allegations of a link between
anosmia and the company’s leading revenue-generating product, absent
independent basis for the denials.85 Rejecting a “statistical significance” standard
and determining that adverse event reports alone are insufficient to plead
materiality in a securities fraud action, the Court stopped short of clarifying how

78. Id. at 1323.
79. Id. at 1322. The Court observed that Matrixx dismissed the warnings from medical researchers as
unfounded, without having conducted their own animal or human research. Id.
80. Id. at 1323.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1324–25 (internal citations omitted). The court held the respondents sufficiently pled scienter,
noting that the evaluation of allegations must be viewed “holistically.” Id.
83. Id. at 1325. The court pointed to the following facts: Zicam comprised seventy percent of Matrixx’s
sales; Matrixx announced fifty to eighty percent rise in sales on the strength of Zicam; Matrixx dismissed
credible reports from medical researchers and prevented Dr. Jafek from using Zicam name in a national
presentation; and after news stories reported a possible link, Matrixx called the reports unfounded without
conducting their own studies. Id.
84. Id. at 1313–14.
85. See infra Part I.
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corporations and courts should apply the “something more” standard.86 Given the
numerous “sources, content, and context[s]” for adverse event reports, the Court’s
decision creates confusion for corporations seeking to understand when a prior
statement may trigger a duty to correct a false or misleading material statement, and
also creates challenges for courts that must apply a complex standard to similarlysituated companies.87 Unsure of their potential exposure under a “something more”
standard, companies may unnecessarily disclose information and thereby provide
less clarity to shareholders trying to make informed investment decisions.88
A. Something More Is Needed Than a “Something More” Standard.
The Matrixx Court determined that, in the absence of statistical significance, “the
source, content, and context of the reports” can support an allegation that a
reasonable investor would deem the reports significant to her investment
decisions.89 Here, the Court pointed to the fact that two medical researchers
informed Matrixx about clinical studies on the effect of the intranasal application of
a different zinc compound on loss of smell as critical data to their materiality
determination.90
The “something more” rule adds another element of ambiguity to an already
nebulous materiality definition.91 Prior to Matrixx, scholars and practitioners
described the case law defining materiality as “elusive” and “ever changing,” and
commented that the determination of materiality is often solely ascertainable post
hoc.92 After Matrixx, this assessment has not changed. A recent article quoted
practitioners stating that the application of materiality is “very difficult” and “one
of the most difficult determinations. And it’s going to remain[ ] that way. I think
86. Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1321, 1323 (finding that the Respondents alleged facts that “revealed a plausible
causal relationship” sufficient to plead materiality). The case mentions the pleading standard under Twombly
and Iqbal, but critics have noted that the Court relied primarily on the pre-PLSRA cases of Basic and TSC. See
e.g. Allan Horwich, An Inquiry into the Perception of Materiality as an Element of Scienter under SEC Rule 10b-5,
67 BUS. LAW. 1 n. 63 (2011).
87. See e.g. Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1321 (listing several forms of adverse event reports).
88. See Brief for the Pharm. Research and Mfr. of Am. and the Biotechnology Indus. Org. as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 24–27 Matrixx v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011) (No. 09–1156), 2010 WL
3426276 at *24–27 [hereinafter Pharm. Research Brief] (noting that absent a clear standard, companies will
disclose too much to shareholders to the detriment of shareholders’ decision-making process); and Tod
Reichert, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano: A Lowering of the Materiality Bar?, CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS, November 1, 2010, http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/matrixx-initiativesinc-v-siracusano-a-lowering-of-the-materiality-bar/ (cautioning that a threshold lower than statistical
significance may cause a change in the frequency of corporate disclosures).
89. Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1321–22.
90. Id. at 1322. Dr. Linschoten forwarded to a Matrixx Vice President “abstracts on the link between zinc
sulfate and the loss of smell” conducted in the 1930s with polio patients. Siracusano v.Matrixx, 585 F.3d 1167,
1170 (2009).
91. Yvonne Ching Ling Lee, The Elusive Concept of “Materiality” Under U.S. Federal Securities Laws, 40
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 661, 663–64 (2004) (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976)).
92. Id. at 663–64 (calling materiality a “‘gotcha’ standard” because courts look to share price fluctuations
and SEC enforcement actions); and Marc I. Steinberg & Jason B. Meyers, Lurking in the Shadows: The Hidden
Issues of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation FD, 27 J. CORP. L. 173, 188 (2002).
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the Supreme Court decision [in Matrixx] is saying, ‘Go out there and struggle, and
best of luck for the next few years.’”93
Under the new “something more” standard, companies must try to ascertain
materiality by assessing the relative significance of diverse sources, content, and
context of potentially conflicting data or conflicting interpretations of data.94 The
FDA has regulatory authority to approve and monitor prescription drugs and overthe-counter drugs sold in the United States, and the agency strictly regulates the
reporting requirements of adverse reactions to drugs throughout the application
and post-marketing processes.95 The FDA’s mandatory regulation of drug safety
reporting requires the several industry sources—applicants, manufacturers, packers,
or distributors—report each serious or unexpected adverse drug experience within
fifteen calendar days after receiving the report and to investigate and follow up with
the FDA after new information is available or upon request by the FDA.96 While the
regulations note that the report does not evidence conclusions by the reporting
entity that the drug caused the reaction, the FDA has prophylactic power to
withdraw the drug from the market absent proof of causation.97
In addition to these mandatory reporting sources, the FDA’s MedWatch
program has been rolled out to the general public, and health professionals and
consumers may voluntarily file an adverse event report online.98 MedWatch
partners include over one-hundred organizations such as the American Medical

93. Horwich, supra note 86, at n. 81 (2011) (citing Materiality: The Hardest Determination 1, 5, 10
(Oct. 5, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/member/Webcast/2011/10_05/
transcript.htm) (password required)). Analyzing the outcome immediately following the Matrixx decision,
several law firm articles keyed on the Court’s statement that companies can control the information they have a
duty to disclose under securities laws by “controlling what they say to the market.” See Gay Parks Rainville &
Deirdre E. McInerney, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano: Supreme Court Snuffs Out ‘Statistical Significance’
Test for Pleading Rule 10b-5 Claims Against Pharmaceutical Companies, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP CLIENT ALERT,
March 24, 2011 (advising life sciences companies to “exercise . . . control” over disclosure); and Decision in
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano Rejects Bright-Line Rule in Securities Fraud Action Based on Pharmaceutical
Company’s Failure to Disclose Adverse Event, DAVIS POLK CLIENT NEWSFLASH, March 22, 2011,
available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/3d1e80e4-07c6-4f1f-923d-00d269490fbe/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/3e8639cf-da6f-4b7d-abf4-01e02f9cae13/03.22.11_lit.html (last visited April 22, 2012)
(noting that all adverse event reports need not be disclosed).
94. William O. Fisher, Key Disclosure Issues for Life Sciences Companies: FDA Product Approval, Clinical
Test Results, and Government Inspections, 8 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH L.REV. 115, 143–44 (2002) (stating that
two researchers, even within the same company, may interpret the same data differently).
95. 21 U.S.C. § 355 et seq. (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 310.305 (2010); 21 C.F.R. § 312.32 (2010); and 21 C.F.R. §
314.80 (2010).
96. Serious adverse drug experiences are defined as those resulting in “[d]eath, a life-threatening adverse
drug experience, inpatient hospitalization or prolongation of existing hospitalization, a persistent or significant
disability/incapacity, or a congenital anomaly/birth defect,” while unexpected adverse drug experiences include
“[a]ny adverse drug experience that is not listed in the current labeling for the drug product.” 21 C.F.R. §§
310.305(b), 314.80(a). The information reported is made publicly available through the FDA’s online Adverse
Event Report System (AERS). http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/InformationOnDrugs/ucm135151.htm?utm_
campaign=Google2&utm_source=fdaSearch&utm_medium=website&utm_term=AERS&utm_content=1.
97. 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.305(g), 314.80(k). See also Matrixx v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2011).
98. MedWatch: The FDA Safety Information and Adverse Event Reporting Program, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/MedWatch/default.htm (last visited April 22, 2012) (using online FDA Form
3500A).
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Association, CVS Pharmacy, BlueCross Blue Shield Association, and PDR Network,
LLC.99 The FDA launched a Transparency Initiative in 2009, creating a Task Force
to educate and solicit additional feedback from consumers, health professionals,
medical researchers, and industry on an ongoing basis.100 Companies also receive
adverse event reports directly from consumers, medical professionals, and the
FDA.101 The array of sources for adverse event reports is, therefore, considerable,
while the accuracy and completeness of adverse event reports can vary widely.102
Beyond the source, companies and courts must also consider the content and
context of adverse event reports.103 Companies and the FDA receive adverse event
reports in different forms, ranging from direct complaints to doctor reports and
from medical journal articles to published clinical studies.104 One scholar states that
adverse event reports “rarely, if ever” provide the “good experimental or
observational” data required to make reliable inferences of causation.105 Adverse
event reports, therefore, often trigger companies to conduct additional studies for
reliable data, and these studies may take the form of a controlled study or an
observational study.106 A controlled study, on the one hand, may demonstrate a
degree of confidence regarding causation, while an observational study may indicate
an association between drug use and an adverse reaction.107 Some studies are peerreviewed, indicating a greater degree of confidence in the data’s credibility and
interpretation, while others are not.108

99. For a complete listing of MedWatch partners, including medical professional associations, insurance
companies and drugstores see MedWatch Partners, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
Safety/MedWatch/ucm170520.htm (last visited April 22, 2012).
100. James E. Valentine, FDA Transparency Initiative (March 2010), FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/ForHealthProfessionals/ArticlesofInterest/ucm206849.htm (last visited April 22, 2012). The
FDA publicly posts both mandatory and voluntary adverse event reports on their website for investor and
consumer review which in 2010 numbered 758,890. Reports Received and Reports Entered into AERS by Year,
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/
AdverseDrugEffects/ucm070434.htm. The Matrixx Court seemingly disregarded the argument that because
mandatory and voluntary reporting information is publicly available, the data was reflected in the share price
and available to investors’ consideration. Pharm. Research Brief, supra note 88 at 16 (citing Basic v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988)).
101. See generally Brief of BayBio as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8 Matrixx Industries v.
Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011) (No. 09-1156), 2010 WL 3426273 at *8 [hereinafter BayBio Brief] (noting
that life sciences companies are inundated with adverse event report information).
102. Id. at *9 (stating that adverse event report data is often acquired “haphazardly or selectively”) (citing
David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence
83, 91 (Federal Judicial Center, 2d ed. 2000)).
103. See infra Part III.
104. Matrixx Indus., Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct 1309, 1321 (2011).
105. Kaye, supra note 4, at 5.
106. BayBio Brief, supra note 101, at 10–14. Here, the abstract provided to Matrixx indicated a link between
anosmia and intranasal application of zinc sulfate, which ultimately “incentivized” Matrixx to engage in further
studies on the impact of zinc gluconate as the active ingredient. Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 585 F.3d
1167, 1183 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d.
107. Id. at *11–14.
108. The FDA website lists peer review plans and peer review results for various studies. Peer Review of
Scientific Information and Assessments, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/
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The Court might have clarified the decision by indicating a minimum threshold
of clinical or observational study that would satisfy the standard and thereby
indicate a “plausible causal relationship.”109 Instead, corporations and courts are left
to “go out there and struggle” to determine the definition of materiality.110
Given the many potential combinations of source, content, and context of
adverse event reports, the Court’s lack of guidance on how to apply “something
more” creates confusion for corporations and courts alike.
B. Lower Courts Applying the Matrixx Pleading Standard Provide Mixed Signals.
After the Matrixx decision, pharmaceutical companies are faced with an even
greater challenge to determine whether a duty to disclose has been triggered based
on prior public statements. A pharmaceutical company faced with determining
whether the source, content, and context of an adverse event report is material or
merely suggests cause for further inquiry may look to post-Matrixx decisions for
guidance.111 The lower court interpretations of Matrixx provide limited guidance at
best.112
Recent court decisions reflect the ongoing challenge of balancing material
disclosure against protecting the market from an influx of trivial information.113
Some courts interpreting Matrixx appear cautious about setting too low a standard
for materiality or, alternatively, indicate an uncertainty about the implications of
Matrixx. For example, the First Circuit has affirmed the dismissal of two securities
fraud claims in which the shareholders deemed disclosures incomplete and,
therefore, misleading.114 The First Circuit noted that “[w]hile a statement of risk
‘does not insulate the speaker from liability . . . neither does it create liability simply
because it does not disclose, at the level of detail the plaintiffs request in retrospect,
all of the factors that contribute to the risk assessment.”115 The Eighth Circuit
recently affirmed dismissal of a case in which the plaintiff alleged a company’s prior

SpecialTopics/PeerReviewofScientificInformationandAssessments/default.htm?utm_campaign=Google2&utm_
source=fdaSearch&utm_medium=website&utm_term=peer review&utm_content=1.
109. See infra note 86. The Court might also have provided examples as to how corporations and courts
should evaluate the various sources of adverse event reports or, at a minimum, how to consider reports that
originate along the spectrum (from consumers to pharmacists and from doctors to medical researchers and the
FDA).
110. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
111. See generally Edward W. Little Jr. & Kelly A. Gabos, Matrixx and Recent Lower Court Decisions,
22 ABA SECURITIES LITIGATION COMMITTEE 20, 22–23 (2012) (analyzing recent securities litigation decisions
post-Matrixx).
112. See generally id.
113. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
114. Little & Gabos, supra note 111, at 22–23 (citing Mississippi Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys., 649 F.3d 5 (1st Cir.
2011) and Hill v. Gozani, 651 F.3d 151 (1st Cir. 2011)).
st
115. Mississippi Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys., 649 F.3d at 29 (citing Hill v. Gozani, 683 F.3d 40, 60 (1 Cir. 2010),
aff’d, 651 F.3d 151 (1st Cir. 2011)).
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class period disclosures established a duty to make future disclosures.116 Notably, the
court left open the possibility that the Matrixx decision may imply that a company’s
pattern of disclosure may establish a duty to disclose, but indicated that such facts
were not present in the instant case.117 In contrast, other courts have determined
that a plaintiff had sufficiently pled materiality and scienter under the Matrixx
pleading standard and a duty to disclose was triggered by overly optimistic or
incomplete prior material statements.118 In Local 731 I.B. of T. Excavators and Pavers
Pension Trust Fund v. Swanson,119 the U.S. District Court of Delaware determined
that the company’s statements were distinguishable from mere “puffery” and
constituted statements of opinion resting on a factual basis that required
correction.120 In a case outside the pharmaceutical context, the court in City of Ann
Arbor Employees’ Retirement System v. Sonoco Products Co.121 denied summary
judgment in which the plaintiff alleged that the corporation failed to disclose price
concessions when it shared price increases in order to allegedly project a position of
market strength.122
Corporations continue to lack clarity from both the Matrixx Court and lower
courts on how to assess the source, content, and context of adverse event reports
under the “something more” standard. Some corporations may be incentivized to
disclose unnecessary information, rather than risk miscalculation of materiality and
potentially costly litigation.123 Such disclosures of non-material data conflict with
the Court’s longstanding concern against “bury[ing] the shareholders in an
avalanche of trivial information[,] a result that is hardly conducive to informed
decisionmaking”124 The Court’s silence on how to apply the “something more”
standard creates confusion for companies and courts and further complicates an
already intricate “total mix” analysis.125 The Matrixx decision is, therefore, more
likely to hinder than foster informed investor decision-making.

116. Minneapolis Firefighters’ Relief Ass’n v MEMC Electronic Materials, Inc., 641 F.3d 1023, 1030 (8th
Cir. 2011) (finding the plaintiff failed to plead actionable omission or scienter).
117. Id. at 1029.
118. See e.g., Local 731 I.B. of T. Excavators and Pavers Pension Trust Fund v. Swanson, No. 09–799, 2011
WL 2444675, at *6 (D. Del. June 14, 2011) (stating that Matrixx “endorses a generous application of the PSLRA
with respect to pleading materiality and scienter under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5”).
119. Id.
120. Id. at *9–10. “Puffery is a ‘vague statement of corporate optimism’ that is said to be ‘so obviously
unimportant to a reasonable investor that reasonable minds could not differ.’” David A. Hoffman, The Best
Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395, 1405–06 (2006).
121. No. 08–2348, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126436 (D. S.C. Oct. 19, 2011).
122. Id. at *59–60.
123. See infra Part IV.A.
124. See infra note 44 and accompanying text. The FDA’s engagement in a robust drug approval regulation,
balancing the benefits of drug approval against the cost of adverse reactions, along with their recent trend
towards greater informational inputs on adverse event reports, makes it unlikely the agency will attempt to
provide a framework or additional guidance to corporations. See infra notes 94–102 and accompanying text.
125. See David H. Kaye, supra note 4, at 1 (“The case offered the Supreme Court an opportunity to speak
clearly and authoritatively about the meaning and limits of significance testing. Unfortunately, the Court did
not rise to this challenge.”); and Dale A. Oesterle, The Overused and Under-Defined Notion of "Material" in
Securities Law, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 167, 184 (2011) (noting the court’s failure to address existing complexities in
the materiality standard).
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V. Conclusion
In Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano,126 the United States Supreme Court
decided a plaintiff is not required to allege “statistical significance” in a securities
fraud claim for failure to disclose adverse events.127 In so holding, the Court
correctly determined the plaintiff sufficiently pled materiality and scienter.128 Given
the complexities of applying the standard of materiality to the facts in any case,
however, the Court missed an opportunity to provide clear guidance to business
entities and to lower courts.129

126.
127.
128.
129.
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131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011).
See infra Part III.
Id.
See infra Part IV.
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